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Finding a Place for Embedded Advertising Without 
Eroding the First Amendment: 
An Analysis of the Blurring Line Between Verisimilar 
Programming and Commercial Speech 
I. INTRODUCTION 
No one expects to turn on the television or go to the movies without 
enduring at least a few advertising pitches for useless and/or 
uninteresting products. But with the advent of new technologies that 
allow commercials to be bypassed, sponsor notices to be skipped, and 
previews to be passed over, advertisers have become increasingly 
aggressive in subjecting media consumers to advertisements during the 
entertainment experience.1 Take, for instance, the television show 
American Idol where the infamous judges are depicted with large Coca-
Cola drinks in almost every scene and winning contestants make Ford 
advertisements presented in a trendy video.2 Products from Dairy Queen, 
Ford, and Sue Bee Honey have made their way onto The Apprentice.3
One episode from The Office has Dwight Schrute working at a Staples 
Office Supply store,4 and another episode features an Olympic bailer.5
An entire plot line on 7th Heaven revolves around Oreo cookies.6
But television is not the only infected medium. Movie plots have 
likewise become an advertising platform. I, Robot “shamelessly” 
promotes a plethora of brands within its first 30 minutes, including: 
Converse shoes, FedEx, the Audi RSQ, JVC, Dos Equis, Ovaltine, and 
Prudential life insurance.7 The plotline of You’ve Got Mail centers on 
1. See FCC, Notice of Inquiry & Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Sponsorship 
Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, MB Doc. No. 08-90, FCC 08-155, at 1 (2008) 
[hereinafter FCC Notice].
2. FCC to Look into Embedded Advertising on TV: Should Viewers be Better Informed 
About Paid-for Props?, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 26, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
25401193 [hereinafter FCC to Look].
3. PATRICK LEE PLAISANCE, MEDIA ETHICS: KEY PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE PRACTICE
62 (2008). 
4. FCC to Look, supra note 2, at ¶ 11. 
5. NBC’s “The Office” Warehouse Features Vertical Baler From Olympic Wire and
Equipment in “Safety Training” Episode on April 12, MARKET WIRE, Apr. 2007, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pwwi/is_ 200704/ai_n18800065. 
6. FCC to Look, supra note 2, at ¶ 11. 
7. Tom Hatori, Top Ten: Most Shameless Uses Of Product Placement In Film, June 6, 2008, 
http://www.movie-moron.com/?p=544. 
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AOL with frequent plugs for Starbucks coffee.8 The list goes on: 
Independence Day—Coca-Cola and Apple; Demolition Man—Pizza Hut 
and Taco Bell; Men in Black II—Mountain Dew, Burger King, and 
Victoria’s Secret; Just My Luck—T-mobile and Pepsi.9 The research 
confirms that these are not isolated instances. Over the past twenty 
years,10 “embedded advertising”11 has grown into a four-billion-dollar 
industry.12
The Federal Communications Committee (FCC) drew attention to 
this new issue in a very old debate rooted in the virtues of advertising13
when it recently announced that it would be adopting a Notice of Inquiry 
and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment on whether the 
current FCC rules effectively handle sponsorship identification.14
Contenders representing every corner of the debate have adamantly 
urged the FCC to proceed in almost every possible direction.15 More 
importantly, however, the FCC’s announcement signals an abrupt end to 
its disregard of aggressive, “‘out-of-control’”16 practices of an industry 
struggling to survive in an economy “shaken to its core”17 and 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. James Karrh, Kathy Brittain McKee & Carol Pardun, Practitioners Evolving Views on 
Product Placement Effectiveness, 43 J. OF ADVERTISING RES. 138 (2003). 
11. For an explanation of this term, see supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
12. PLAISANCE, supra note 3, at 61. For a detailed history of the growth in advertising 
expenditures among television networks see DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF 
THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 612–16 (2d ed. 1993). For a background on advertising 
expenditures among movie producers see MELVIN SIMENSKY ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW 34–36
(2d ed. 1997). 
13. See MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, ETHICS AND MANIPULATION IN ADVERTISING: ANSWERING A 
FLAWED INDICTMENT, vii (1997) (“Briefly put, the attack says that advertising manipulates 
consumers, and that this manipulation justifies corrective political action. This attack’s influence 
waxes and wanes, but it is never without adherents.”); RANDALL MARLIN, PROPAGANDA AND THE 
ETHICS OF PERSUASION 180 (2002); JENNIFER GUNNING & SOREN HOLM, ETHICS, LAW, AND
SOCIETY 220 (2006); see also Robert Harris, The Seven Deadly Sins and Seven Virtues in 
Advertising, VIRTUAL SALT, July 21, 2000, http://www.virtualsalt.com/think/xtrseven.htm 
(“Advertisements present values and goals that are in conflict with traditional values.”); Jaiboy 
Joseph, The Virtues of Advertising, BUSINESS LINE, Jan. 06, 2000, http://www.the 
hindubusinessline.com/2000/01/06/stories/190602ji.htm (“We have come a long way since the days 
when H.G. Wells opined that ‘advertising is legalised lying.’”) (“Without advertising, the price of a 
jar of honey could really sting you.”).
14. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 1. 
15. See generally FCC comments for Proceeding 08-90, http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/cgi-
bin/websql/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.hts?ws_mode=retrieve_list&id_proceeding=08-90&start= 1&end 
=208&first_time=N. 
16. Stephanie Clifford, Product Placements Acquire a Life of Their Own on Shows, N.Y.
TIMES, July 14, 2008, at C1 (quoting Robert Weissman, the managing director of Commercial Alert, 
a nonprofit group which attempts to restrict commercial marketing). 
17. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill Is Sold, AIG 
Seeks to Raise Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at 1; see also Emily Steel, Ad-Spending Forecasts 
Are Glum, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2008. 
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desperately trying to “remain competitive in a multiplatform universe.”18
Indeed, with the new presidential administration in power, and bearing in 
mind that the FCC commissioners are political appointees, more onerous 
regulation appears to be on the horizon.19 Regardless of the FCC’s 
ultimate decision, debate will continue over the proper regulation of 
embedded advertising. 
Part II of this article provides a brief history of advertisement 
regulation and lays a foundation as to why embedded advertising has 
become such a popular and widespread practice in the entertainment 
industry. 
Part III explores possible legal responses to five questions that must 
be answered by the FCC before it determines whether and how to 
regulate embedded advertising. The threshold question addressed in this 
section is whether the current FCC rules effectively address embedded 
advertising practices. Second, this section will explore whether FCC 
regulation is the best way to address embedded advertising. Third, this 
section will discuss whether the FCC has the vested congressional 
authority to promulgate rules governing embedded advertising. Special 
emphasis will be given to this question because of its critical nature and 
because it is so fiercely disputed. Fourth, this section will briefly review 
possible regulatory options the FCC may adopt. Finally, as this article 
determines that embedded advertising is a hybrid form of speech 
possessing attributes of both commercial and normal speech, this section 
will explore whether any such regulations might violate or erode First 
Amendment rights. This section has been structured to emphasize the 
preliminary questions because the FCC is in the preliminary stages of its 
decision making process and has not yet definitively resolved to regulate 
embedded advertising. 
Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
18. John Eggerton, CCFC Wants FCC To Ban Product Placement In Kids Shows, Limit In 
Primetime, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 24, 2008, available at  http://www.broadcastingcable. 
com/article/159827-CCFC_Wants_FCC_To_Ban_Product_Placement_In_Kids_Shows_Limit_In_ 
Primetime.php?q; see also HAROLD ORENSTEIN & DAVID E. GUINN, ENTERTAINMENT LAW AND 
BUSINESS §7.6.2.2 (1996). 
19. See Richard J. Wegener, Shareholder, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Speech at PMA’s 30th
Annual Promotion Marketing Conference: Product Placement & Government Regulation: FCC vs. 
FTC: Why Government Regulation of Product Placement Will Likely Expand Despite Insufficient 
Evidence of Consumer Harm, (Nov. 20-21, 2008), http://www.fredlaw.com/bios/attorneys/ 
wegenerrichard/RWegener_PMA_2008%20Law%20Conference.pdf); see also Louis E. Frenzel, 
Expect Changes In Wireless Regulation This Year, MOBILE DEV. & DESIGN, Feb. 9, 2009, available 
at http://mobiledevdesign.com/tutorials/fcc-changes-wireless-regulation-2009-0209.
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II. BACKGROUND 
This section is essential to the understanding of the current debate 
because the application of the FCC rules depends largely on the context 
which produced them.20 This article will use the general term “embedded 
advertising” to describe circumstances where sponsored products or 
brands are included in media programming.21 This type of advertising is 
also referred to as “stealth advertising,” “covert sponsorship,” or 
“product placement.” The two former terms are used frequently by those 
opposed to such advertising,22 while the latter is a non-descriptive 
pejorative employed by those in favor of it.23 This article’s definition of 
embedded advertising is formulated from the FCC’s description of the 
term and is arguably a compromise between the two camps. Embedded 
advertising includes both “product placement” (in the non-pejorative 
sense) and “product integration.” Product placement occurs when 
branded products are “[inserted] into programming in exchange for fees 
or other consideration.”24 On the other hand, product integration involves 
integrating the sponsored product with the plot of the program and/or the 
dialogue.25 This distinction may not always be crystal clear in practice 
and will be discussed in a later section of this article.26
 A.  Brief History of Advertising Regulation 
The Radio Act of 1927 represents Congress’s first efforts to require 
sponsorship identification for broadcasters.27 This statute granted 
enforcement power to the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), the 
20. Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting: 
Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations, 1927–63, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 332 
(2004). 
21. FCC Notice, supra note 1, at 1. 
22. Writers Guild of America, East and West, Are You Selling to Me?, Nov. 14, 2005, at 1, 
http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/news_and_events/press_release/2005/white_paper.pdf 
[hereinafter Writers Guild of America] (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
23. See American Advertising Federation, Government Affairs, Product Placement, 
http://www.aaf.org/ default.asp?id=349 (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). 
24. See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Associate Director for Advertising Practices, Federal 
Trade Commission, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert, 6 (Feb. 10, 2005) 
[hereinafter Letter from Engle], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/050210product 
placement.pdf. 
25. Writers Guild of America, supra note 22, at 2; Wayne Freidman & Jean Haliday, Product 
Integrators Tackle Learning Curve, 73 ADVERTISING AGE 18 (2002). There is also a term known as 
“title placement,” which describes the practice of inserting brand names into entertainment program 
titles. 
26. See infra Part III, E. 
27. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 330. 
167] EMBEDDED ADVERTISING 171
precursor to the FCC.28 It provided in part: 
All matter broadcast by any radio station for which service, money, or 
any other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or 
promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, 
from any person, firm, company, or corporation, shall, at the time the 
same is so broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case 
may be, by such person, firm, company, or corporation.29
For the next 20 years, however, neither the FRC nor the FCC found this 
provision relevant in the supervision of radio broadcasting as sponsors of 
that era “almost always craved public recognition.”30 Nevertheless, when 
adopting the provision, Representative Emanuel Cellar argued that the 
statute was designed to disallow radio stations from camouflaging 
advertising as program content.31
The statute began to have more influence when political 
advertisements became a growing concern for the FCC during Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s presidential campaign in 1944.32 Some stations began 
broadcasting prerecorded spot announcements labeling them only as 
“political announcements” with no further identifying information from 
the sponsor.33After the FCC deliberated for three months as to what kind 
of enforcement action to pursue, it espoused administrative guidelines 
that clarified the statutory language of the Radio Act. These rules have 
remained fundamentally unaltered.34 The new administrative guidelines 
required “stations that received anything of value, including production 
assistance (records, transcriptions, talent, scripts, or other material or 
services) . . . to identify at the beginning and end of the program the 
nature of the support.” 35 Broadcasts under five minutes needed only to 
28. The Supreme Court sustained the Federal Radio Commission’s power to delegate under 
the Radio Act in Fed. Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 
(1933). 
The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934 as the successor to the 
Federal Radio Commission and is charged with regulating all non-federal government 
use of the radio spectrum (including radio and television broadcasting), and all interstate 
telecommunications (wire, satellite and cable) as well as all international communications 
that originate or terminate in the United States. is charged with regulating interstate and 
international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. The FCC’s 
jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions. 
Federal Communications Committee, About Us, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html. 
29. RADIO ACT OF 1927, ch. 169, § 19, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (emphasis added). 
30. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 334. 
31. Id.; see 67 CONG. REC. 2309 (1926). 
32. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 341. 
33. Id.
34. See Nat’l Ass’n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 830 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
35. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 341–42.
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make one announcement.36 This sponsorship disclosure requirement was 
codified as an amendment in section 317 of the Communications Act of 
1934.37 After the adoption of the new guidelines, the FCC issued a report 
restating the purpose and intent of the rules.38 In that report, the FCC 
expressed the now well-known axiom, “[a] listener is entitled to know 
when the program ends and the advertisement begins.”39
Television sets became pervasive in the 1950s, making their way into 
millions of households across America.40 Due to the “relatively lax 
enforcement of Section 317,” sponsors began to introduce 
advertisements with unidentified sponsors more frequently.41 Rather than 
naming the company or trade company advertising the product, 
broadcasters would merely describe the product. For example, “This 
program is sponsored by the Sink Man.”42 In response, the FCC issued 
the following statement: “In all cases, the public is entitled to know the 
name of the company it is being asked to deal with, or at least, the 
recognized brand name of his product.”43 The FCC’s justification for this 
ruling was that it would “prevent . . . fraud being perpetrated on the 
listening public by letting the public know the people with whom they 
are dealing.”44
The true regularity of the practice of failing to identify a sponsor was 
exposed in the late 1950s by the television quiz show scandals.45 Though 
on the surface it appears that sponsorship identification and dishonesty 
about the rules of a quiz show are separate issues, they “merged in the 
public’s mind to form one image of commercialism’s corrupting 
influence on broadcasting.”46 In one example, House investigators 
uncovered the fact that a department store paid a quiz show producer 
$10,000 to allow one of the store’s employees to participate on the show 
as a contestant and bring up the store during the broadcast.47 This 
36. Id.
37. Now codified as 47 U.S.C. § 317 (1980). 
38. FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF 
BROADCAST LICENSEES 47 (1946). 
39. Id.; Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 344. 
40. TVHistory.com, Television History – The First 75 Years, http://www.tvhistory.tv/1950-
1959.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2009). 
41. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 347. 
42. Identification on Broad. Station, Public Notice, 40 F.C.C. 2d (1950); see also
Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 346-47.
43. Identification on Broad. Station, 40 F.C.C. 2d, at 3; see also Re Cmty. Telecasting Serv., 
10 F.C.C. 2d 727 (1967). 
44. Id.
45. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 346. 
46. Id. at 347. 
47. Id. at 352; see also Investigation of Television Quiz Shows, Pts 1 & 2: Hearings Before 
the Spec. Subcomm. on Legislative Oversight of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce, 86th Cong. 1142 (1959). 
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occurrence, of course, not only involved the failure to disclose the 
sponsor adequately, but also a “payola”—a term used in the 
entertainment industry to describe clandestine payments to a producer to 
promote a product or brand name through a broadcast.48
This time, Congress responded by amending and expanding the 
Communications Act. The amendments both increased and decreased the 
FCC’s regulatory authority. First, Congress prohibited the FCC “from 
requiring disclosure for broadcasters’ routine use of free records or 
props.”49 Next, Congress broadened the legal requirement to divulge 
hidden sponsorships to include “parties involved in production.” 50
Lastly, these amendments provided the FCC with discretionary authority 
to “develop or suspend rules.”51
After these amendments were implemented, TV networks separated 
advertising from entertainment programming beginning in 1960.52 As 
former producer/screenwriter of The Bill Cosby Show and Murphy 
Brown, Korby Siamis explained the segregation of advertising and 
network programming after 1960: “During my career, there was a clear 
distinction between art and advertising. On occasions that we used a 
product name, we would receive notices from the network Standards and 
Practices department. If the reference were necessary for the joke, it 
would stay. Otherwise we would take it out.”53 She continued by stating, 
“The concept that we would ever have been expected to include product 
names or usage in our writing would have been beyond ludicrous, and 
would have been strongly fought as the worst kind of assault on our 
creative process. . . .”54 These circumstances and opinions provide the 
historical context for the largely unaltered standards that govern 
embedded advertising today.55
48. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 376 n.2. 
49. Id. at 356; see also Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-
752, sec. 8, 317(a)(1), 74 Stat. 889, 895 (1960) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2000)). 
50. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 356. 
51. Id.
52. LAWRENCE R. SAMUEL, BROUGHT TO YOU BY: POSTWAR ADVERTISING AND THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 122–52 (University of Texas Press, 2001). 
          53. Letter from Korby Siamis to Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, MB Doc. No. 08-90, (Aug. 
23, 2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_docume 
nt=6520170200. 
54. Id.
55. Amendments to Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 86-752, sec. 8, 317, 508, 74 
Stat. 889, 895–97; see Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 376 n.2. For an in-depth look at the impacts of 
pay television see MICHAEL I. RUDELL, BEHIND THE SCENES: PRACTICAL ENTERTAINMENT LAW
195 (1984). 
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III. ANALYSIS 
The debate raised by the FCC’s Notice of Inquiry and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking centers on whether the current FCC rules 
effectively address embedded advertising practices. If the answer is yes, 
no further inquiry is required and the advertising industry can continue 
on its current course. If the answer is no, critical issues and questions 
arise: Is FCC regulation the best way to address this issue? Does the FCC 
have the vested congressional authority to promulgate rules governing 
embedded advertising? What rules should the FCC adopt? Finally, would 
any such rules violate First Amendment rights? 
The analysis that follows will explore the gamut of possible answers 
to each of these questions. The questions will be addressed in the order 
presented above as each is influenced by its predecessor. Because the 
FCC is currently in the preliminary stages of its decision making process 
and has not yet definitively resolved to regulate embedded advertising, 
this research will focus on the threshold questions concerning the FCC 
and its authority to act. For example, whether embedded advertising 
actually causes harm is a more foundational question in the current legal 
climate than what kind of restrictive measures the FCC should adopt. 
Obviously, the time may come when the legal landscape is transformed, 
at which time the nuances and details of the latter questions will deserve 
additional attention.56
 A.  Do Current FCC Rules Effectively Address Embedded 
Advertising Practices? 
Today, section 317(a)(1) of the Communications Act reads nearly 
identically to the version adopted in 1927,57 making the sponsorship 
identification requirements the oldest statutory provision dealing directly 
with broadcast advertising.58 The FCC has adopted 47 C.F.R. § 
56. On March 3, 2009 President Obama nominated Julius Genachowski as the new FCC 
Chairman. Genachowski was heavily involved in the Internet efforts of the Obama campaign and 
previously worked for Democratic FCC Chairman Reed Hundt. See Declan McCullagh, Obama 
Picks Net Neutrality Backer as FCC Chief, CNET NEWS, Mar. 3, 2009, available at 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10187067-38.html. Though there is wide speculation, writers on 
The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal have indicated that they believe Genachowski will 
focus on Internet issues. See David Oxenford, Julius Genachowski as New FCC Chair - What Will It 
Mean to Broadcasting’s Future?, DIGITAL MEDIA WIRE, Jan. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2009/01/15/julius-genachowski-new-fcc-chair-what-will-it-mean-
broadcasting%2526%2523039%3Bs-future%3F. 
57. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2008) (“All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any money, 
service or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or charged or 
accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, 
be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person . . . .”).
58. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 331; see also John Eggerton, Group to FCC: Lay Off 
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73.1212(f), which more clearly elucidates requirements for sponsorship 
identification: 
[A]n announcement stating the sponsor’s corporate or trade name, or 
the name of the sponsor’s product, when it is clear that the mention of 
the name of the product constitutes a sponsorship identification, shall 
be deemed sufficient for the purpose of this section and only one such 
announcement need be made at any time during the course of the 
broadcast.59
After a run-in with the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals regarding lax 
policies of enforcement influenced by the Reagan administration, the 
FCC defined “sponsorship” expansively, stretching the term to include 
all agreements involving consideration or promises of consideration.60
Thus, if a broadcasting station airs an infomercial—i.e. content that is 
sponsored and could be erroneously identified by an audience as a 
show—such an agreement would require an identification 
announcement.61 Similarly, the utilization of a product in a television 
show for valuable consideration would require a sponsorship credit.62
The FCC considers a failure to reveal a sponsor who provides valuable 
consideration or services as a “payola” is punishable by a fine or 
imprisonment for not more than one year or both.63 Such criminal 
penalties are enforced and prosecuted by the Department of Justice.64
The current minimum fine for every discovered sponsorship 
identification violation is $4,000 per occurrence.65
Current broadcast industry practice appears incongruent with these 
regulations as “[m]ost television shows satisfy their legal disclosure 
obligations merely by including a credit to the effect that ‘promotional 
considerations were provided by ABC Company.’”66 While often the 
Product Plugs: Broadcasters, Advertisers Fighting Disclosure Rules, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/115826-Group_to_FCC_ 
Lay_Off_Product_Plugs.php. 
59. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(f) (2008) (last visited Oct. 13, 2009). 
60. See Nat’l Ass’n for Better Broad. v. FCC, 830 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also
Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 332. 
61. Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 332. 
62. Id.; see also Christian McGrath, Political Video News Releases: Broadcasters’ 
Obligations Under the Equal-Opportunity Provision and FCC Sponsorship-Identification 
Regulations, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 313, 325–29 (1993). 
63. Id.; see also McGrath, supra note 62. 
64. Id.
65. In the Matter of The Commission’s Forfeiture Policy Statement and Amendment of 
Section 1.80 of the Rules to Incorporate the Forfeiture Guidelines, FCC 97-218, (1997), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Compliance/Orders/1997/fcc97218.doc. 
66. Barry M. Benjamin, The Call for a Code of Conduct, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 19, 2005, 
available at http://www.mediaweek.com/mw/esearch/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1001 
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credits “fly by incredibly quickly, and often shrink to a small portion of 
the screen,”67 it is commonly known that “[b]asic disclosure is generally 
all that the law requires.”68 In other words, to satisfy its burden under the 
FCC disclosure rules, a producer must provide sponsorship identification 
to the extent that “the listening and viewing public understands the 
nature and source of the material they are hearing and seeing,” and 
“where disclosure itself is not adequate for the audience to form such an 
understanding, stricter measures are needed.”69
Feature films are a different story completely. Since 1963, the FCC 
has exercised authority over feature films, but has allowed them 
exemption status under the sponsorship rules.70 Thus, producers of film 
need not make any kind of sponsorship identification as long as the film 
was not produced with the main intent of broadcasting it.71 The FCC’s 
jurisdiction over feature films is questionable since section 317 arguably 
covers only “broadcasts.”72 But again, the FCC has defined the term 
broadly—holding that it has the authority to make such regulations 
outside the traditionally defined “broadcast” context.73
As described by an FCC Chairman, the “ultimate goal” of these rules 
is “to ensure that the public is able to identify both the commercial nature 
of any programming, as well as its source.”74 Yet, recent FCC 
enforcement actions appear nuanced and petty in comparison to the 
prevalent embedded advertising practices throughout the industry. 
Viewers of average intelligence of the Wheaties Fit to Win Challenge
could not possibly think that General Mills was a disinterested party with 
the Wheaties brand plastered throughout the program. Nor would a 
viewer of average intelligence regard The Right Side of Armstrong and 
700237; see also John Eggerton, National Media Providers: FCC Lacks Jurisdiction; FCC Rules 




68. Jonathan S. Adelstein, Commissioner, FCC, “Fresh is Not as Fresh as Frozen”: A 
Response to the Commercialization of American Media, Address Before the Media Institute (May 
25, 2004), available at 2004 FCC LEXIS 7458, at 18. 
69. Id.
70. In the Matter of Amendment of Sections 3.119, 3.289, 3.654 and 3.789 of the 
Commission’s Rules, Report and Order, 34 FCC 829, 837 (1963).
71. Id.; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(h) (2008) (“Any announcement required by section 
317(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, is waived with respect to feature motion 
picture film produced initially and primarily for theatre exhibition.”).
72. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2008). 
73. Comments of the National Media Providers to FCC, MB Doc. No. 08-90, (Sept. 22 
2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document= 
6520170175 [hereinafter Comments of National Media Providers].
74. Statement of FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, Re: Sponsorship Identification Rules and 
Embedded Advertising, MB Doc. No. 08-90,  available at http://www.adlawbyrequestlegacy. 
com/_db/_documents/ FCC-08-155A1.pdf [hereinafter Statement of Kevin Martin].
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assume that Armstrong Williams, a conservative newspaper columnist 
and entertainer, was free from any monetary influence in his message 
supporting the No Child Left Behind Act. Had these violators provided 
the single credit at the conclusion of their respective programs, they 
could have avoided hefty FCC fines. Conceivably, the FCC has pursued 
these trivial violations as a warning to advertisers in an effort to thwart 
the flood of embedded advertisements. 
In truth, the FCC has adopted a broad interpretation of a statute that 
appears to contemplate the requirement of sponsorship identification 
announcements “at the time [of]”75 or during embedded advertisements. 
The FCC could easily construe the statute as requiring real-time 
announcements of sponsors during embedded advertisements. An 
administrative agency’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous statute 
which is administered by the agency may receive substantial deference 
under Chevron76 unless such construction is procedurally defective, 
arbitrary or capricious in substance,77 or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.78 As long as “basic disclosure” is all that is required by the FCC 
interpretation, broadcasters will continue to provide only “basic 
disclosure.” As advertising techniques become more sophisticated, it is 
unlikely that a 70-year-old understanding of an ambiguous statute will 
continue to be adequate. 
 B.  Is FCC Regulation the Best Way to Address Embedded 
Advertising? 
The response of consumer advocates to this question is categorically 
“yes.” The group that initiated the turning of the FCC’s regulatory gears 
was Commercial Alert.79 Commercial Alert lodged a complaint with the 
FCC arguing that this kind of “stealth advertising” reaches unsuspecting 
and unaware consumers in a way that is “an affront to basic honesty.”80
75. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2008) (reads “All matter broadcast by any radio station for which any 
money, service or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or promised to or 
charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting, from any person, shall, at the time the same is so 
broadcast, be announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such person . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
76. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
77. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2008). 
78. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
79. Commercial Alert’s mission is “to keep the commercial culture within its proper sphere, 
and to prevent it from exploiting children and subverting the higher values of family, community, 
environmental integrity and democracy.”  Commercial Alert, Our Mission, http://www.commercial 
alert.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
80. Letter from Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert, to Marlene H. Dortch, 
Sec’y, FCC (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.commercialalert.org/fcc.pdf [hereinafter 
Commercial Alert Complaint].
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Commercial Alert warned that if the FCC failed to act, the net effect 
would be that many viewers would not be aware of the influence 
embedded in their programming.81 It urged the FCC to “restore some 
honesty” to the industry by “strengthening the sponsorship identification 
rules.”82
This was neither the first complaint lodged nor the first agency that 
Commercial Alert approached. Indeed, in 2003 it filed a complaint with 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) urging it to react against embedded 
advertising through its congressionally delegated authority under section 
five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which gives the FTC the 
power to ban unfair or deceptive acts or practices.83 Commercial Alert 
argued that embedded advertising is “deceptive because it flies under the 
viewer’s skeptical radar.”84. It argued that embedded advertising is 
“unfair because it is advertising that purports to be something else.”85
The FTC formally responded to Commercial Alert’s complaint in 
February 2005 by stating, “it does not appear that failure to identify the 
placement as advertising violates Section 5 of the FTC Act.”86 The FTC 
went on to explain that regulation was not the wisest course because 
embedded advertising does not generally involve a “false or misleading 
objective, [or] material claims about a product’s attributes.”87 In fact, the 
FTC held that “few objective claims appear to be made about the 
product’s performance or attributes. That is, in most instances the 
product appears on-screen . . . or is mentioned, but the product’s 
performance is not discussed.”88
With regard to feature films, producers are adamant that the long-
standing exemption from sponsorship identification requirements be left 
undisturbed.89 They argue compellingly that the FCC could not find a 
“good reason to extend the rules to feature films [and] the Commission 
should reach the same conclusion” today.90 Because there is a 
“substantial time lag between production of ‘feature’ film and its 
exhibition on television,” this diminishes the impact a feature film could 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 12. 
83. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). 
84. Letter from Gary Ruskin, Executive Dir., Commercial Alert, to Donald Clark, Sec’y, 
FTC (Sept. 30, 2003), available at. http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/050210ftccommercial 
alert.pdf. 
85. Id. 
86. Letter from Engle, supra note 24, at 2. 
87. Id. at 3. 
88. Id.
89. Comments of National Media Providers, supra note 74, at 41; see also In the Matter of 
Amendment of Sections 3.119, 3.289, 3.654, and 3.789 of the Commission’s Rules, Report and 
Order, 34 F.C.C. 829, 837 (1963). 
90. Comments of National Media Providers, supra note 74, at 42. 
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have to “‘improperly affect broadcasting’ vis-à-vis sponsorship 
identification.”91
On the subject of television broadcasts, advertisers and producers 
argue that embedded advertising does not need to be regulated by the 
FCC because “shows that feature excessive or misplaced embedded 
advertising risk losing their audience.”92 Accordingly, this would 
produce a naturally limiting effect on the practice which would allow 
producers to determine how best to avoid “losing their audience.”93
Perhaps one of the underlying motives of the FTC’s decision not to 
regulate embedded ads was the belief that a more favorable outcome 
might be achieved through independent intra-union negotiations and 
collective bargaining agreements. The Writers Guild of America pointed 
this out to the FCC.94 Unsurprisingly, the writers have their own interests 
at the forefront of their strategy and have urged broadcasters to 
reimburse them not only for the work they do as writers, but as 
advertisers.95 The Screen Actors Guild has publicly supported this 
request and urges broadcasters to better compensate writers for product 
placements.96 They have threatened, “[w]e would naturally prefer to talk, 
knowing that to be the wisest course of action among partners. . . . This 
Code of Conduct can be established through negotiations with our 
business partners. Failing that, we will seek additional FCC 
regulation.”97
The position of the Writers Guild will inevitably lead it to support 
FCC regulation.98 Producers and advertisers came to a full realization of 
the effectiveness of embedded advertising when Hershey Foods allowed 
the feature film E.T. to incorporate Reese’s Pieces brand candy into its 
plot.99 M&Ms declined to allow the film to feature its candy. Two weeks 
after the movie’s premier, the Reese’s Pieces brand sales went “through 
the roof” and this example is still known today as one of the “most 
successful instances of movie product placement.”100 Since then the 
91. Id. (quoting In the Matter of Amendment of Sections 3.119, 3.289, 3.654 and 3.789 of the 
Commission’s Rules, Report and Order, 34 FCC 829, 837 (1963)).
92. See, e.g., Mary McNamara, Fabulous Project Runway Tainted by Tsunami of Product 
Placement and Tacky Cross-Promotion, MULTICHANNEL NEWS (Feb. 21, 2008),
http://www.multichannel.com/blog/1300000330/post/410022241.html.
93. Id.
94. See American Advertising Federation, supra note 23 at ¶ 5. 
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. Writers Guild of America, supra note 22, at 8. 
98. See generally Id. 
99. Wegener, supra note 19. 
100. JAMES G. SAMMATARO, FILM AND MULTIMEDIA AND THE LAW § 4:51 (2008); see
tvSmarter, Safe Sex and Product Placement, Nov. 26, 2008, http://tvsmarter. 
wordpress.com/2008/11/26/safe-sex-and-product-placement. It is worth noting that Coors Beer was 
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practice of embedded advertising has shown no signs of slowing down. 
Last year there were 3,291 product placements on top-rated American 
Idol alone.101 NBC recently made an agreement with Ford Motor 
Company to feature its Lincoln automobiles on The Tonight Show with 
Jay Leno in exchange for $9 million dollars of Ford advertising 
commitments across its network.102 ABC also recently made a deal with 
Sears for $1 million to show Sears vehicles delivering and installing 
equipment on the popular show Extreme Makeover: Home Edition.103
When reviewing these facts, it is impossible to say that the Writers Guild 
would be able to effectively limit or restrict sponsorship identification in 
broadcasting. In these circumstances, the Writers Guild simply does not 
possess enough clout to discourage producers and advertisers from 
engaging in such incredible economic opportunities. 
There is no question that the practice of embedded advertising will 
continue to grow, and it is unlikely that even sweeping administrative 
regulation will slow the process.104 What is more likely is that the fickle 
media market of consumers will determine what level of embedded 
advertising it will endure.105 Websites criticizing filmmakers and 
television producers for flagrant advertising have already appeared and 
are widely popular.106
 C.  Does the FCC Have Vested Congressional Authority to Regulate 
Embedded Advertising? 
Whether harm arises from the proliferation of embedded 
advertisements is perhaps the most hotly contested issue with regard to 
embedded advertising, and one which will ultimately determine whether 
also a product featured on E.T. but experienced no sales increase as a result. Reply Comment of 
American Advertising Federation et al. to FCC, MB Doc. No. 08-90, Nov. 21, 2008, available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6520187449 
[hereinafter Comments of American Advertising Federation]; see Cristel Antonia Russell & Michael 
Belch, A Managerial Investigation into the Product Placement Industry, J. OF ADVERTISING. 
RES. 74 (2005) (the study’s small sample and main reliance on close-ended survey questions could 
not fully confront and address all the challenges and opportunities associated with product placement 
planning). 
101. PLAISANCE, supra note 3, at 62. 
102. Wegener, supra note 19 at 3. 
103. Id.
104. See Karrh, supra note 10, at 143–44.
105. Compare Kielbowicz, supra note 20, at 331 (“In this line of reasoning adopted by 
Congress and regulators, stations relying too heavily on advertising or ceding too much control to 
sponsors would drive their listeners to competing stations more attuned to the public interest. Such 
regulation by the marketplace, however, worked best when the audience could distinguish a 
sponsored message from the surrounding programming or recognize programming itself as 
sponsored content. To this end, broadcast law has always mandated that stations identify content 
sponsors.”).
106. See, e.g., Hatori, supra note 7. 
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the FCC has the power to act. Because of the critical nature of this issue, 
this section will explore its nuances in detail —first, with respect to 
harms arising in general and second, with respect to harms arising 
specifically to children. 
One of the arguments asserted by producers and advertisers is that 
the FCC does not have the authority to promulgate additional rules 
governing sponsorship identification because no harm is involved in the 
current practices it is seeking to regulate.107 To begin, “an administrative 
agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be 
grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.”108 At a minimum, 
the FCC is required to show that the harms it is attempting to rectify or 
prevent are not based on “mere speculation or conjecture.”109 Thus, 
before the FCC is able to adopt new rules, it must satisfy its burden in 
showing a “substantial need for more extensive disclosure requirements 
for product placement than already exist under the Commission’s 
commercial prohibitions . . . under Section 317 and the Commission’s 
rules and policies.”110 The FCC must also “demonstrate that the harms it 
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a 
material degree.”111
 1.  Are there really “harms” arising from embedded advertising?  
Commercial Alert’s complaint argued that “[p]roduct placements are 
inherently deceptive, because many people do not realize that they are, in 
fact, advertisements.”112 Because of this deception and because the 
current rules allow such deception, Commercial Alert alleged that the 
rules are inadequate to regulate the “new challenges posed by embedded 
advertising.”113
Commercial Alert’s conclusory arguments are both accurate and 
flawed. In a sense, it is dishonest to initiate advertisements without 
identifying their source if it is not clear that the entertainment program is 
ending and an advertisement is beginning. The fact that the advertising 
industry has become so reliant on such advertising suggests that it is an 
107. See generally Comments of National Media Providers, supra note 73 at 18–41.
108. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). 
109. Comments of National Media Providers, supra note 73, at 55 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 
507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993)). 
110. Id. at 55. 
111. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993). 
112. Commercial Alert Complaint, supra note 80, at 3; see generally Commercial Alert, 
Product Placement, http://www.commercialalert.org/issues/culture/product-placement (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2009). 
113. Id. 
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effective endeavor.114 Such “dishonesty” might be curbed by requiring 
real time identification;115 however, in another sense, embedded 
advertising provides an additional component of “verisimilitude to 
fictional programming.”116 The Writers Guild commented, “As any 
historian of television knows well, advertising and the medium of 
television have been inseparable ever since Milton Berle first donned a 
dress.”117 America has increasingly become a service oriented, 
commercialistic, and materialistic society.118 Consequently, a fictional 
program based on reality would be quite unauthentic if it failed to 
include the realities of such a society. 
Other consumer advocates have argued that embedded advertising is 
deceptive purely because it “‘mimics’ program content.”119 In this 
regard, it has been described as a “Trojan horse” as it is delivered to 
homes in an objective and neutral way only to unleash a belly full of 
commercial manipulation.120 This camp points to research that suggests 
viewers assume that featured products or brands are a writer’s attempt at 
realism or simply understand them to be a result of an increasingly 
commercialist society.121 Proponents of this view claim that this 
perception is only exacerbated by embedded advertising which appears 
to be unpaid.122 They argue that “as long as trademarked brands are 
sometimes used for creative effects without payment or for a nominal 
fee, the audience cannot discern when content was ‘induced by 
consideration.’”123 Thus, because it is deceptive, it is harmful.124
114. See Statement of Kevin Martin, supra note 74. 
115. See infra Part III, D. 
116. American Advertising Federation, supra note 23 ¶ 2. 
        118.  Writers Guild of America, supra note 22, at 1. 
118. See CHARLES MERLIN UMPENHOUR, FREEDOM, A FADING ILLUSION 337 (2d ed. 2005). 
119. Comments of N. E. Marsden to FCC, MB Doc. No. 08-90, (Nov. 24 2008), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6520187733 
[hereinafter Comments of N. E. Marsden] (“At least two product placement agencies have said as 
much on their websites: ‘The benefit to the marketer is the exposure to a large audience in an 
environment that is perceived to be objective . . . Often consumers do not even realize they are being 
marketed to.’” (quoting OnPoint Marketing & Promotions, Product Placement Defined, July 24, 
2006, available at http://www.onpointmarketing.com/product-placement.htm) ) (“Products shown 
on screen within a film’s storyline have higher credibility than products in advertisements which the 
audience knows are paid announcements.” (quoting Vista Group, http://vistagroupusa. 
com/serv02.htm) ).
120. Id.
121. Cristel Antonia Russell, Investigating the Effects of Product Placements in Television 
Shows: The Role of Modality and Plot Connection Congruence on Brand Memory and Attitude, 29 J.
OF CONSUMER RES. 74 (2002). 
122. Gail Schiller, Brands Take Buzz to Bank Through Free Integration, HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER, Apr. 13, 2006, http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article_display.jsp?vnu_ 
content_id=1002343793; see also Wayne Friedman, Product Placement Dealing: Try to Keep Your 
Hands in Your Pockets, MEDIA POST, Apr. 14, 2006, http://www.mediapost.com/publications/ 
index.cfm?fa=Articles. showArticle&art_aid=42245. 
123. Comments of N. E. Marsden, supra note 119 (“When content is induced by a payment, 
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Producers and advertisers have counter-argued that consumer 
advocates’ accusations of harm are “anecdotal” and “not based on actual 
evidence.”125 In fact, this group argues that consumers benefit from 
embedded advertising because 1) it supports “quality programming in 
unobtrusive ways and . . . add[s] context and realism to programs,”126 and 
2) “provides viewers with additional information that they can use 
outside their viewing experience in their own daily lives.”127 As 
Discovery Communications, Inc. explained, its “creative team works 
extensively to ensure that product placement and in-program messaging 
blends into the creative content in ways that improve the viewer’s 
knowledge and enjoyment of the program.”128 Indeed, this group argues 
that the only protest media consumers have is against “disproportionate 
or clumsy embedded advertising.”129
Technological advances support the advertisers’ position. 
Advertisers must face the reality that file sharing and television and 
movie piracy are at an all-time high.130 Only a few years ago the 
popularity of DVRs131 and VODs132 was predicted to “change the 
advertising culture.”133 These machines, such as TiVo, allow viewers to 
jump past commercials and watch broadcasts at times of their choosing. 
One could easily argue that a technological revolution has taken place.134
two factors are of material interest to the consumer: 1) there is a promotional motive underlying the 
choice to pay for the placement, and 2) the content might NOT have been included without the 
payment.”).
124. Id. 
125. Comments of American Advertising Federation, supra note 100, at 9 (“Not only do the 
pro-regulation comments fail to offer any support for their claims that product placement is 
extraordinarily persuasive—and therefore inherently deceptive —the very articles cited by 
Commercial Alert conclude that there is no consensus on the impact of product placement.”); see 
Sheri J. Broyles, Subliminal Advertising and the Perpetual Popularity of Playing to People’s 
Paranoia, 40 J. OF CONSUMER AFF. 392, 404–05 (2006); see also HERBERT JACK ROTFELD, 
ADVENTURES IN MISPLACED MARKETING 152–53 (2001); Frank R. Kardes, The Psychology of 
Advertising, PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL INSIGHTS AND PERSPECTIVES 297 (Timothy C. Brock & 
Melanie C. Green eds., 2d ed. 2005). 
126. Reply Comment of Discovery Communications, Inc. to FCC, MB Doc. No. 08-90,  at 3 
(Nov. 21, 2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_ 




130. Karrh, supra note 10 at 138–40; see also FCC Notice, supra note 1. 
131. Jonathan Stickland & James Bickers, How DVR Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, Oct. 30, 
2008, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/dvr.htm. 
132. Mark Sweney, Broadcasters to Launch Joint VOD Service, GUARDIAN, Nov. 27, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/nov/27/bbc.itv. 
133. Jonathan M. Gitlin, Stealth Advertising: Marketing Creeps into the Evening News, ARS
TECHNICA, July 12, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/07/stealth-advertising-marketing-
creeps-into-the-evening-news.ars (last visited July 12, 2007). 
134. Id.; FCC to Look, supra note 2, at 1. 
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Advertisers explain that embedded advertising is “simply a pragmatic 
response to audiences being increasingly difficult to reach with 
traditional mass media.” 135 In short, such efforts are a “public relations 
strategy.”136
Advertisers and producers finally argue that such advertising is not 
deceitful—and thus not harmful—because “consumers ultimately are 
well aware of product placement practices.”137 Producers argue that “[i]f 
anything, consumers tend to assume any appearance of a product is a 
paid placement, even when it is not (e.g., use of Reese’s Pieces in 
E.T.).”138 In fact, producers point to research that suggests “American 
respondents were more likely to believe that placements are usually a 
form of paid advertising and less likely to support government 
restrictions on the practice.”139 Some have gone so far as to label such 
possible regulations as “demeaning and intrusive.”140
The arguments of advertisers and producers emphasize only part of 
the truth. If media consumers are not “confused” and do in fact “assume” 
that embedded advertisements are paid for by the corporations 
representing the brand or product, such a system is inherently flawed and 
will taint the messages of those speaking without monetary reward. For 
example, the movie Castaway could be characterized as one long FedEx 
ad. “Portions of Cast Away were filmed in Memphis at the FedEx 
international headquarters,”141 and Gayle Christensen, managing director 
of FedEx’s global brand management admitted, “[w]e’re all over this 
film. We’re really a character central to the movie.”142 Surprisingly 
though, FedEx spokeswoman Darlene Faquin confirmed, “[W]e didn’t 
pay anything [for Cast Away]. It was the writer’s idea to focus on 
FedEx’s efficiency. They came to us.”143 Consider also E.T., which did 
not involve an agreement for consideration to feature the Reese’s Pieces 
brand. From the perspective of the media consumer, a writer’s opinion or 
135. Comments of American Advertising Federation, supra note 100, at ii–iii. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 9; Reply Comments of CBS Corporation to FCC, MB Doc. No. 08-90 (Nov. 21, 
2008), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document= 
6520187521 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
138. Comments of American Advertising Federation, supra note 100, at 10. 
139. Karrh, supra note 10, at 140. 
140. Comment of Discovery Communications, supra note 126 at 4 (“[T]here is no evidence 
that adult viewers are confused or misled by embedded advertising, and suggestions that adults are 
unable to distinguish between programming and advertising, and thus need protections extended to 
them that were originally designed for children, are demeaning and intrusive.”).
141. Stranded: Behind-the-Scenes of Cast Away: A comprehensive behind-the-scenes look at 
Cast Away, STUMPED (2004), http://stumpedmagazine.com/Articles/stranded.html. 
142. David Finnigan, FedEx Won’t Go Postal on Cast Away; Pepsi Returns for Oscars, Sans 
Refill, BRANDWEEK, Dec. 4, 2000, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ 
m0BDW/is_47_41/ai_67716804. 
143. Stranded: Behind-the-Scenes of Cast Away, supra note 141 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
167] EMBEDDED ADVERTISING 185
artistic expression could easily be mistaken for an embedded 
advertisement. 
While producers are correct in stating that “[m]uch of the support for 
more stringent rules reflects general hostility toward advertising and 
commercial activity,”144 is it proper to accept such a dynamic which 
holds the views of writers hostage to the assumption that they are 
receiving compensation for their opinions? Under this theory of harm, 
artists who may wish to extol the virtues of a product without payment 
are assumed to be biased or paid off. 
 2. Are there special harms to children? 
Many subtleties exist with regard to childhood harms from 
advertising, but much of that discussion is beyond the scope of this 
article. This complex issue will be given brief treatment in this section 
with an emphasis only on the potential harms arising from embedded 
advertising because the FCC faces special challenges when protecting 
children from embedded advertising. The FCC must respect the rights of 
adult media consumers and regulate in the narrowest technologically 
feasible fashion. Thus, it has implemented certain limits on 
advertisements during hours children are likely to consume media 
broadcasts. Unfortunately, children have become legal means of many 
consumer advocates who have wished to play the child card at every 
opportunity. 
The FCC has always had a special interest in protecting children 
from manipulative advertising practices. Commissioner Jonathan S. 
Adelstein announced that the FCC “should move quickly . . . seeking 
comment on how to implement sensible restrictions on interactive ads 
targeting children.”145 The FCC received a filing by a group called 
Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood (“CCFC”)146 urging the 
FCC to limit embedded advertising in primetime broadcasts explaining 
that “2 million kids ages 2-11 watch American Idol each week, a show 
144. See American Advertising Federation, supra note 23, at ii. 
145. Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm’r, FCC, Stuck in the Mud: Time to Move an Agenda to 
Protect America’s Children, Address Before the Media Institute (June 11, 2008), available at 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-282885A1.pdf. 
146. The group’s mission is as follows: “to reclaim childhood from corporate marketers. A 
marketing-driven media culture sells children on behaviors and values driven by the need to promote 
profit rather than the public good. The commercialization of childhood is the link between many of 
the most serious problems facing children, and society, today. Childhood obesity, eating disorders, 
youth violence, sexualization, family stress, underage alcohol and tobacco use, rampant materialism, 
and the erosion of children’s creative play, are all exacerbated by advertising and marketing.” 
Campaign For a Commercial-Free Childhood, About CCFC, http://www.commercialexploitation. 
org/aboutus.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
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that is filled with plugs for Coke and Ford.”147 This would mean 
restricting embedded advertising during the 8-10 PM programming hours 
in which children are likely to be watching.148
The CCFC’s suggestion is not without merit. However, it should be 
noted that the entertainment industry is wholly reliant—and always has 
been—on revenues generated from advertisement sales. Normatively 
speaking, the power of the advertisement industry’s purse in influencing 
all media should be a default supposition by any and all media 
consumers. However, the universal access to broadcast entertainment 
merits additional measures of caution which must be exercised when 
considering the infirm, incapacitated, and/or youthful viewers. A “tough 
love” approach would be to expect such viewers to adjust to the realities 
of American society rather than to shield them from its negative effects. 
Nevertheless, the CCFC’s position supporting the restriction of 
embedded advertising during primetime raises legitimate concerns about 
the logistics of enforcing such a rule. The logistics are complicated by 
the “hidden” nature of embedded advertising, which is the major concern 
of critics.149 For instance, what would the FCC’s default investigative 
position be if a product made its way to a show on primetime television 
without following new regulatory requirements? A detailed and fact-
intensive inquiry would be required to discover if the appearance of the 
product was done for consideration or simply a fortunate coincidence for 
the benefiting brand name. Such investigations would lead to more 
transparency; however, they might also damage industry trade secrets or 
fatally harm fragile or tentative relations between producers and 
advertisers in an industry known for its impulsiveness and 
unpredictability. 
Conversely, the FTC reasons that there is no child harm involved 
with embedded advertisements because the advertisements are not 
deceptive. In its letter ruling in response to Commercial Alert’s 
complaint, the FTC stated that there is “lack of a pervasive pattern of 
deception and substantial consumer injury.”150 As the producers are swift 
to point out, simply expressing distaste for child exposure to embedded 
advertising is insufficient.151 The FTC explained that “if no objective 
claims are made for the product, then there is no claim as to which 
greater credence could be given; therefore, even from an ordinary child’s 
147. Eggerton, supra note 18 at 1. 
148. Id.
149. Commercial Alert Complaint, supra note 80. 
150. Letter from Engle, supra note 24. FTC Denies CsC’s Petition to Promulgate Rule on 
Product Placement in Movies, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/predawn/F93/csc-petit5.htm (last visited Oct. 
23, 2009). 
151. Id. at 4–5.
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standpoint, consumer injury from an undisclosed paid product placement 
seems unlikely.”152
If the FCC were to follow suit of the FTC, it would likely find that 
the current standards are sufficient to notify media consumers of 
embedded advertising.153 In fact, the FCC faces a heavy burden in that it 
must support any change to its rules on embedded advertising with 
“substantial evidence”154; thus, it is unlikely to act successfully in 
implementing an intrusive regulation on the current embedded 
advertising practice. 
 D.  If Regulation is Warranted, What Rules Should the FCC Adopt? 
Another thorny component of this issue is if regulations are needed 
to control embedded advertising, what rules should the FCC adopt? 
Again, because the FCC has not definitively resolved to regulate 
embedded advertising, this section will only highlight pieces of a 
complex puzzle. If the legal landscape does shift, the nuances of this 
question should be explored more fully. Though, in all reality the 
regulatory options available beyond those already provided by current 
FCC regulations are extremely limited. If advertisers and producers 
continue their efforts to slip advertisements past DVR and VoD 
technology, consumer advocates will not be satisfied unless some kind of 
alert takes place when such advertisements occur. 
Consequently, Commercial Alert has offered a range of solutions 
centered on the idea that “product placements should be identified when 
they occur.”155 One option would be for the words “‘[a]dvertisement’ [to 
appear] when the product placement is on the TV screen.”156 Producers 
describe these suggestions as “distracting . . . ‘pop-up’ announcements or 
bottom-screen scrolls.”157 Other more dramatic options include lengthy 
texts throughout the program, or total interruptions with “full screen oral 
and visual ‘warning’ each time a branded product is used.”158 A final, 
more moderate suggested option would be “[d]isclosure at the outset of 
the program . . . in plain English, such as: ‘This program contains paid 
advertising for . . . .’”159
152. Id. at 4. 
153. See id.
154. Comments of American Advertising Federation, supra note 100, at ii; see also Comments 
of National Media Providers, supra note 73, at 55, 59 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 
770–71 (1993)). 
155. Commercial Alert Complaint, supra note 80, at 4. 
156. Id.
157. Comment of Discovery Communications, supra note 126, at 9. 
158. Id.
159. Commercial Alert Complaint, supra note 80 at 4. 
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How far would such rules extend? Adoption of regulations governing 
embedded advertising would undoubtedly embark the FCC on a very 
slippery slope. How would cross-promotional campaigns be handled—
i.e. commercials within commercials? Suppose a celebrity wishes to 
accept valuable consideration to make an appearance at a charity event. 
How would such a celebrity promotion be handled under the rules? And 
what of record-company employees posing as teenagers on MySpace?160
Often companies receive valuable consideration to promote the brands 
and products of other companies which do not fall into the same 
market.161
Advertising advocates have convincingly argued that if the adopted 
rules are “impracticable . . . no advertiser or programmer could ever 
agree to them, leading to the complete elimination of embedded 
advertising.”162 Such a result would not be congruent with the 
congressional intent of section 317, which was designed only to require 
sponsorship identification, not a complete elimination of certain forms of 
advertising.163 This is a compelling argument because as notices and 
warnings become intrusive and distracting,164 embedded advertising will 
lose its appeal to producers and advertisers alike. 
 E.  Would FCC Rules Violate First Amendment Rights? 
The First Amendment prohibits all governmental actors (including 
administrative agencies) from making laws that infringe on the freedom 
of speech.165 A threshold question in this instance is whether FCC 
regulation would infringe on the freedom of speech and therefore 
whether a First Amendment analysis is applicable. A wide variety of
government actions sufficiently burden speech so as to be considered an 
infringement and are thus subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 
Therefore, to determine whether the FCC’s potential regulations comply 
with the First Amendment, it must be determined whether embedded 
advertising involves “speech.” If so, it must also be determined whether 
the FCC’s potential regulations restrict speech in a manner which is 
consistent with the purpose of the First Amendment. This inquiry is 
dependent upon what level of protection embedded advertising warrants. 
Commercial speech has been defined by the Supreme Court as an 
160. Id. at 1. 
161. Johnny Davis, The Stealth Sell, TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 5, 2007, 
http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_ and_style/women/the_way_we_live/article2162542.ece 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2009). 
162. Comment of Discovery Communications, supra note 126, at 9. 
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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expression that “propose[s] a commercial transaction”166 or an 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience.”167 Commercial speech was not protected until 1975 when the 
Supreme Court decided Bigelow v. Virginia.168 This decision was 
solidified by Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., where the Court again confirmed that 
commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment, though to a 
lesser degree than normal speech.169 The definitions of commercial 
speech offered by the Court have been difficult to apply.170 In practice, 
however, if the speech in question is an advertisement of some form and 
refers to a specific product, and the speaker has economic motive in 
speaking of the product, it is likely commercial speech.171 If speech is 
deemed to be commercial, it has less protection under the First 
Amendment—albeit some. Commercial speech restrictions must pass 
intermediate scrutiny to be upheld by the Court.172 Keeping audiences in 
ignorance cannot be the goal of the restriction of speech or such 
restriction is prohibited by the First Amendment.173 However, if the 
government scheme focuses on secondary goals such as lowering 
consumption of something undesirable or limiting negative effects of 
some objectionable activity, the Court will require that the speech 
restriction significantly limit consumption of that evil and that no 
available method exists that is significantly less intrusive than the 
regulation.174
In Central Hudson Gas,175 the Court developed a four-part analysis 
to review the validity of a government’s regulation of commercial 
speech. Under this analysis, the government has the burden of proof.176
In part one, the Court will determine whether the speech in question is 
protected commercial speech.177 If the speech is not commercial speech, 
normal First Amendment protections apply. Commercial speech must be 
lawful and may not be misleading or have a high risk of becoming 
166. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 760 (1976). 
167. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
168. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
169. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
170. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 1088 (3d ed. 
2006). 
171. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760. 
172. See id.
173. See id. (declaring unconstitutional a Virginia Law restricting pharmacists from publishing 
prices of prescription drugs). 
174. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 557. 
175. Id.
176. Id. at 561; see also Comments of American Advertising Federation, supra note 100. 
177. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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deceptive.178 If the speech is deemed commercial and deceptive or 
misleading, no First Amendment protection is afforded the speech.179 In 
part two of the Central Hudson test, the Court inquires whether there is a 
substantial government interest in regulating this kind of speech.180 If
there is no substantial governmental interest, then First Amendment 
protection will be afforded to the speech.181 In the third part of the test, 
the court will determine whether the governmental interest is directly 
advanced by the speech regulation.182 If it is not, the speech receives First 
Amendment protection and the regulation is invalidated.183 Finally, the 
Court will determine whether the regulation is “not more extensive than 
is necessary” to serve the governmental interest.184 In other words, the 
government must show that its interest “cannot be protected adequately 
by more limited regulation of . . . commercial expression.”185 Otherwise 
stated, the regulation must be a reasonable fit.186 If the fit is not 
reasonable, the commercial speech will receive First Amendment 
protection and the regulation will be invalidated.187 Moreover, if the 
regulatory scheme is irrational, inconsistent, or not likely to achieve its 
means, the government fails part four of the Central Hudson test.188
In the case of embedded advertising, the overarching question is 
whether it should be considered commercial speech. Obviously, critics of 
embedded advertising wish to label such advertising practices as 
commercial speech so as to allow heavier regulation. Conversely, those 
who promote embedded advertising wish to push it into the normal 
speech category to avoid such regulation. The only real distinctions 
between normal speech and commercial speech are the intent of the 
speaker and the understanding of the audience.189 Is embedded 
advertising designed to sell products or is it designed to entertain? The 
truth is that it is designed to do both. Advertisers and companies like 
Discovery “work together to create an organic viewer experience so that
the integrations enhance the storyline.”190 Even critics of embedded 
advertising admit that “[t]he effectiveness of embedded advertising rests 
178. Id. at 566. 
179. Id.
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on blurring the line between commercial and non-commercial speech.”191
Therefore, one commentator accurately labeled embedded advertising as 
a kind of “hybrid speech.”192
Over the last few decades, courts have not interpreted hybrid speech 
consistently.193 Generally, however, branded entertainment is considered 
by courts to be a form of entertainment or artistic expression, and thus 
entitled to First Amendment protection.194 Likewise, the FCC’s own 
policy has afforded a greater degree of protection to producers and 
advertisers. In the 1970s, the FCC adopted a test to determine whether a 
broadcast is considered an advertisement. The test is as follows: “The 
primary test is whether the purportedly non-commercial segment is so 
interwoven with, and in essence auxiliary to the sponsor’s advertising (if 
in fact there is any formal advertising) to the point that the entire 
program constitutes a single commercial promotion for the sponsor’s 
products or services.”195 Thus, under the current policy, a program 
replete with embedded advertisements would still likely not be 
considered commercial in nature. 
The circumstance presenting the most intricate First Amendment 
concerns regarding potential FCC regulation would be if an embedded 
advertisement is broadcast and the advertisement is determined not to be 
misleading. The entire inquiry of whether the speech would be protected 
would revolve around whether the ad was commercial speech. Perhaps 
what is most alarming about the FCC’s potential regulation is that a court 
could easily define the speech as commercial, and afford it less 
protection, allowing the FCC to regulate it under a “reasonable” scheme. 
This is alarming because it is not true that embedded ads are purely 
commercial in nature. As such, an entire class of speech which would 
have traditionally found protection under the First Amendment could be 
found to be unprotected simply because of the taint of a commercial 
venture. Moreover, regulation could easily extend beyond embedded 
advertising and include many more kinds of speech likewise tainted with 
commercial intent. This should be incredibly disconcerting when 
considering the fact that America is becoming ever more 
commercialistic.196 If such a regulation were promulgated, and ultimately 
191. Comments of N. E. Marsden, supra note 119, at 14. 
192. Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech and 
Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2836, 2841 (2005). 
193. See Wegener, supra note 19, at 986. 
194. See Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983); Downing v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2001); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 
255 F.3d 1180, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2001). 
195. In Re Public Notice Concerning the Applicability of Commission Policies on Program-
Length Commercials, 44 F.C.C.2d 985 (1974). 
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upheld by a court, it would signal an erosion of First Amendment 
principals so vital to the functioning of a free democracy197 and essential 
to the quest to seek truth.198
IV. CONCLUSION 
If the FCC has the initiative and an exceedingly strong interventional 
pull—and perhaps presidential encouragement—embedded advertising 
regulation is not out of the question. However, proponents of FCC 
regulation of embedded advertising face many hurdles: legal barriers, 
public policy concerns, limits on administrative agency power, etc. Nor 
does it appear that the broadcasters, producers, and advertisers will give 
up their new marketing technique without a bitter fight. And why should 
they? The outcome of this legal battle may to leave open to regulation a 
valuable and traditionally protected class of speech. In the end, what’s 
the harm in having cups of Coca-Cola in front of American Idol judges? 
Audiences don’t seem to mind all that much. In fact, if given a choice, 
surely most would choose embedded advertisements over traditional 
ones—at least for now. 
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